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Abstract. Preference relations are intensively studied in Economics,
but they are also approached in AI, Knowledge Representation, and
Conceptual Modelling, as they provide a key concept in a variety of
domains of application. In this paper, we propose an ontological foun-
dation of preference relations to formalise their essential aspects across
domains. Firstly, we shall discuss what is the ontological status of the
relata of a preference relation. Secondly, we investigate the place of pref-
erence relations within a rich taxonomy of relations (e.g. we ask whether
they are internal or external, essential or contingent, descriptive or non-
descriptive relations). Finally, we provide an ontological modelling of
preference relation as a module of a foundational (or upper) ontology
(viz. OntoUML).
The aim of this paper is to provide a sharable foundational theory of
preference relation that foster interoperability across the heterogeneous
domains of application of preference relations.
Keywords: Preference Relations, Ontology of Relations, Foundational Ontol-
ogy, Conceptual Model, OntoUML
1 Introduction
Preference relations have been extensively studied in Economics as they provide
an essential theory to formalise and possibly explain human economic behaviour.
Preference relations are also ubiquitous in Computer Science, in particular in
AI, Knowledge Representation, and Multiagent Systems, as they provide a key
concept in domains such as planning, autonomous agents modellisation, recom-
mender systems, and resource allocation. Moreover, the use of preference rela-
tions is very extensive in Conceptual Modelling, for instance in applications to
domains such as business process, services, and economic exchange.
Although preference relations are an ubiquitous concept in many areas, a
clear ontological foundation of them is still to be developed. In this paper, we
start the program of providing an exhaustive ontological analysis of preference
relations. In particular, we intend to provide an analysis of preference relations
that integrates a theory of preference relations with a larger theory of the main
ontological categories, by initiating the development of a module for preference
relations to be integrated within a foundational (or upper) ontology (cf. [2, 9]). A
foundational ontology is a theory of the most general categories that are required
in heterogeneous modelling tasks and whose principles hold across-domain. The
foundational ontology program is a quite interdisciplinary endeavour that re-
quires cognitive adequacy, philosophical awareness, as well as effective formal-
isations. Examples of such very general categories are object, event, property,
relation, state, process, space, and time.
The mathematical treatment of preference relation is very well understood
as well as their empirical foundation. Preference relations usually involve an
agent who provides a ranking (a type of ordering) among the available options
or alternatives.
An essential distinction between preference types is that between ordinal
vs cardinal preference. Ordinal preference are simply a (type of) ranking of the
options, whereas cardinal preferences associate to each option a value that repre-
sents the level of satisfaction of the agent concerning that option. A formalisation
of ordinal preference relation in terms of modern formal logic has been devel-
oped by the Nobel Prize for Economics Kenneth Arrow [1], who was inspired by
the axiomatic method of Tarski. Preference relations are modelled by means of
binary relations that satisfy a number of axioms, usually related to the theory
of orders (e.g. total, partial, or weak orders). That is, preference relations can
be axiomatised within a first-order theory of orders.
The foundation of cardinal preference relation is traditionally referred to the
work of von Neumann and Morgenstern about the theory of expected utility
[29]. In general, cardinal preference relations are usually modelled by means of
utility functions defined on a set of alternatives with values in a suitable set of
numbers (usually, the real numbers).
Traditionally, preference relations are ultimately founded on the choice be-
haviour of an agent, see [10]. Cardinal preferences can be rationalised, under
suitable conditions, by ordinal preference, and ordinal preferences can in turn
be derived from choice functions that meet a number of suitable conditions. This
type of foundation grounds a preference relation, which is allegedly something
that is in the mind of an agent, in an observable behaviour, that is, the agents’
actual observable choices. This operationalisation of the concept of preference
relations was one of the most salient contributions of the economic foundation
of preference, justifying the empirical elicitation of human agents’ preferences.
Another important distinction between preferences depends on whether they are
ascribed to individual agents or to collective agents. Collective preferences are
important when modelling preferences ascribed to societies, groups of agents,
or sets of users (e.g. in recommender systems). The foundation in Economics of
collective preference is essentially due to [1]. A discussion of the formalisation of
collective preferences in terms of a first-order theory of ordering is proposed in
[17].
A recent approach to the foundation of preference relations has been de-
veloped by Dietrich and List [5, 4] and discussed in [15, 19]. Here, preference
relations are dependent on the properties of the alternatives at issue, whose
salience depends on the views of the agent. This view brings us close to the
approach of this paper in that the properties of the preferences are intended in
an ontological sense. Thus the work of Dietrich and List is one of the closest
related work to the present contribution.
Although the formalisation of preference relations is quite well established,
a detailed ontological understanding is missing. We intend to fill this gap by
initiating the investigation of the ontological foundation of preference relations.
The methodology of this paper is the following. We start by analysing the
semantics of sentences of the form “agent i prefers a over b”. That is, we look
for those pieces of reality that are required in order to make the statements
about preferences true. Specifically, we investigate what are the truth-makers,
see for instance [12], of the statements about preferences. This view has been
introduced for the ontological analysis of relations in [7]. This approach naturally
leads to asking important ontological questions about which type of objects are
related by a preference relation, to what extent preference relations depends on
the ontological properties of the relata, which type of relations is the type of
preference relation.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we informally analyse the
type of preference relations by discussing their place within a taxonomy of re-
lations. Secondly, we propose a formalisation of our analysis by means of an
ontologically well-founded approach to conceptual modelling. In particular, we
extend the methodology of OntoUML, which provides a solid ontologically deep
approach to conceptual modelling [9], to provide a formal ontological under-
standing of preference relations. Our aim is to develop a module of OntoUML
for preference relations that explicitly manifests the truth-makers of preferen-
tial statements and relates preference relations to the main general categories
of a foundational ontology. Finally, we discuss how to model various types of
preference relations by extending our proposed OntoUML module.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses an
informative taxonomy of relations. Section 3 proposes how to place preference
relations within the taxonomy of relations and discusses what may counts as a
truth-maker of a relational sentence involving preferences. Section 4 proposes the
modelling of preference relations in OntoUML and presents viable extensions.
Section 5 concludes.
2 A taxonomy of relations
We summarise the discussion of the kinds of relations in terms of their truth-
makers. To provide a fine-grained analysis of relations, we introduce three pairs
of distinction that were traditionally at the core of important debates in an-
alytical philosophy on the nature of relations: internal and external, essential
and contingent, and descriptive and non-descriptive relations. We summarise
the examples of this types of relations in Table 1.
Before proposing the definitions of those distinctions, we have to introduce a
number of important concepts in ontology to categories properties. The choice
of terminology we use in this paper is mainly due to [7]. A formalisation of the
subsequent concepts in first-order logic is presented in [2, 9, 8, 22].
An individual quality, or simply a quality, is a property of an object, usually
used to make comparisons between objects along a certain dimension. We say
that the quality inhere in its object, which is termed the bearer of the quality.
The relations of inherence is a particular type of existential dependence, which
has been formalised in [9]. Examples of qualities of an object are the color of this
rose or the weight of this laptop. We say that the quality existentially depends
on its bearer, in the sense that the color of a certain rose is always ontologically
separated from the color of a different rose. To compare qualities of different
objects, we make the distinction between the qualities of an objects and the
values of those qualities, i.e. the quality values (or qualia). The quality values
are abstract objects that are introduced for the purpose of explaining or mea-
suring the similarity of two objects along a certain dimension (e.g. the color).
Quality values are possibly organised into metric spaces with a distance function
that captures the similarity judgments between quality values. Examples of such
metric structures are Ga¨rdernfors conceptual spaces, cf [6].
Relational qualities (or externally dependent modes in [9]) are qualities whose
existence depends (besides on the bearer of the quality) on an object which is
ontologically separated to the object in which they inhere.1 Examples of rela-
tional quality are Mary’s desire of buying a Ferrari which existentially depends
on Mary, but also on the object of the desire. In Section 4, we shall discuss
quality values also for relational qualities.
We term a quality intrinsic of an object if and only if it does not depend on
any other object besides its bearer. For instance, one may view the color of an
object as a quality that only depends on the object.
An essential property of an object is an intrinsic property that depends on
the mere existence of the object. For example, if one views that any existing
object must have a mass, then the mass is an essential property of any object.
We move now to the definitions of types of relations. We start by recalling the
distinction between internal and external relations. We use a first-order notation
for relations, where R(a1, . . . an) denotes an n-ary relation. We say that R is
internal if and only if its truth-value only depends on the intrinsic properties of
its relata; a relation is external if that is not the case.2 For instance, the truth-
value of “a is taller than b” depends on the height of a and b, which are intrinsic
properties of a and b, whereas the truth-value of “a desires b” does not depend
only on intrinsic properties of a and b, hence it is external.
1 We do not have space here to provide an exhaustive view of the separation of objects.
We simply say that two objects are separated if they are existentially independent,
cf [9].
2 This is the definition provided by Russell [25]. A stronger definition is the one pro-
posed by Moore [14], which views an internal relation as a relation the holds merely
in virtue of the existence of the relata. This second view of internal relation is what
we term here essential, following the terminology of [7].
A relation is essential if and only if its truth-value depends only on the
existence of its relata; it is contingent otherwise. For instance, “a is taller than
b” is not essential, since the height is not an essential property of the object, e.g.
there may be moments in time where a person b is taller than a person a. By
contrast, if one views that any object, in virtue of its mere existence, must have
a mass, then “a is heavier than b” is an essential relation.
Finally, we introduce the distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive
relations, which have been investigated in particular in [7].
A relation is descriptive if and only if its truth-value depends on at least one
property of some of its relata which is existentially dependent on another distinct
relata; it is non-descriptive otherwise. For instance, in a comparative relation
between objects, as in the case of “a is taller than b”, the height differential that
makes a taller depends on b (that is, it is externally dependent on b), thus the
relation is descriptive. By contrast, a comparative relation between mere quality
values is non-descriptive: according to this view, that the number associated to
the height of a is bigger or smaller than the number associated to the height of
b only depends on the numbers themselves.
The following table summarises the examples of the types of relations that we
have introduced. As the table shows, descriptive vs non-descriptive and internal
vs external provides the two dimensions for analysing relations. Moreover, one
may find essential relations in any possible combination of the previous criteria.
For the relationship between this taxonomy of relations and the problem of
reifications of relations, that is, the problem of discussing which type of relations
deserves reification, we refer to [7].
In the next section, we shall discuss which is the suitable categorsation for
preference relations.
Table 1. Types of relations
3 The type of preference relations
We discuss now what is the placement of preference relations within the taxon-
omy of relations discussed in the previous section. At the end of this section,
we apply the categorisation of preference relations in order to elicit the truth-
makers of statements about preferences. We focus on sentences such as ‘i prefers
a to b”, where i is an agent and a and b are alternative options. In this section,
we abstract from the type of preference relation, e.g. whether they are cardi-
nal or ordinal preferences, or individual or collective preferences, and we aim to
approach any preference relation.
Preference relations are in fact ternary relations, we denote them by means
of the formula pref(i, a, b). The first component of the preference relation i is an
agent, thus the property of agency must be spelled our in order to provide an ex-
haustive ontological model of a preference relation. Here, we simply assume that
the user, or the modeller, can endorse any vision of agency she or he may see fit
(e.g. the belief-desire-intention model of agency [23, 3]). In the case of collective
preferences, that is where i is a collective agents or a community of agents, we
need to choose a view of collective agency to complement the ontological model
of preference, e.g. [11, 21, 20].
The type of the other two components of the preference relation is in fact
quite general. Preference relations may be defined on very heterogeneous types of
entities. For instance, an agent may have preferences over objects, candidates for
elections, parties, vacation plans, evening events, services, loans or mortgages,
stock options, and so on. Preference relation are indeed an ubiquitous concept
in a variety of economic settings. Thus, in principle, we do not want to put any
substantial restriction on the domain of the possible pairs of entities that may
enter the second and the third component of the preference relation.
Concerning the ontological status of the truth-makers of a statement about
preference, we notice that the qualities of the entities a and b are indeed not
sufficient for assessing whether a is preferred to b or not. For instance, a blue car
may be preferred to a red one by a certain agent, whereas the opposite may hold
for another agent. Moreover, the preferences of an agent may evolve through
time, may depend on what an agent already owns, may depend on the resources
available to the agent. This examples shows that we have to access the view that
the agent i has about the options a and b, in order to assess the truth-value of
the preference relation.
To understand the relationship between the options involved in a preferential
statement and the agent, we introduce the concepts of value, value magnitude,
value entity (or value bearer), and value beholder, cf [28].
A value beholder is a role that an agent plays qua agent who is making a
choice, or assessing a preference, between two options 3. The value entity is
again a role, this time, it is the role that an option plays in the context of a
preference assessment of an agent. The value entity is a role that depends on an
agent i and on the option at issue. For simplicity here, we assume that the value
3 For an ontological theory of roles, we refer to [9] and [13]
entity of an option for an agent is unique, thus we refer to it by the definite
description “the value entity of a for i”.4 The category of value is intended here
as a category of qualities that inhere in the value beholder. An element of this
category represents the value of the value entity for the value beholder.
The value magnitude is an abstract category whose function is to enable
comparisons between the values that agents associate to value entities.5 We may
assume here that this category as an abstract set of ordered points. In treating
preference relation, we are assuming that relational qualities (such as the value
of a value entity for a value beholder) have also quality values. In particular,
the quality value of the value of an option for an agent i is an element of the
category of value magnitude. To formalise this view, we may introduce a relation
of location between the relational qualities (the category of value) involved in a
preference statement and the space of values (the category of value magnitude).6
For instance, in the context of the statement “Mary prefers a Porsche to a
Ferrari”, Mary plays the role of the value beholder, the options Porsche and
Ferrari are playing the role of the value entities of this context, the values of
this value entities for Mary (as value beholder) are represented as elements of
the category of values, and the quality values associated to those options are
represented by means of elements of the category of value magnitude.
Applying the definitions of the previous section, we can categories the entities
involved in a preferential context as follows. The value of an option a for an agent
i is a relational quality that inheres in the value beholder (the role of i) and that
depends on the option a (as value entity). Analogously, the value of an option b
for i. What counts as a truth-maker of the preferential statement is whether for
agent i the value magnitude associated to the value entity of a is greater than
the value magnitude associated to the value entity of b (according to the scale
provided by the category of value magnitudes).
On this ground, we can assess the placement of preference relations pref(i, a, b)
among the taxonomy of the previous section.
Firstly, we show that preference relations are not internal, thus they are
external relations. Remind that in an internal relations, the individual qualities
of the relata are sufficient to assess the value of the statement. In the case of
preference relation, the qualities that are required to assess whether a is more
valuable than b for i are external qualities that inhere in i.
4 This simplification amounts to assuming that in a preference statement only one
dimension of choice is involved [15, 19]. That is, the value of a for i does not depend
on any further conditions. To extend this modelling, one may assume that the value
of a for i may depend on a number of parameters; e.g. “the value of a for i given
that i already has a certain amount of a” may capture the marginal value for i of
getting a further a.
5 A specification of this category, and what types of metric spaces is associated to it, is
left for future work and for dedicated application of specific views of preferences. We
shall also discuss this point in the next section, when we approach the distinction
between cardinal and ordinal preferences.
6 This is the way qualities and quality values are related for instance in DOLCE, cf.
[2].
Secondly, preferences are descriptive relations. According to our previous
definition, a relation is descriptive if the truth-value of the statement depends
on at least one relational quality that depends on one of the other relata. In the
case of preference relation, the value of a (or b) for agent i is indeed a relational
quality of i that depends on one of the (other) relata of the preference relation,
namely a (or b).
Finally, preference relations are contingent relations: the mere existence of the
relata is not sufficient for assessing the truth-value of pref(i, a, b). For instance,
the mere existence of i, a and b does not make a or b valuable for her or him, as
i may not be aware of their existence, or i never had to compare a and b.
Therefore, to conclude, preference relations are external, descriptive, and
contingent relations.
3.1 The truth-makers of statements about preference relations
In order to assess the truth-value of a statement about preferences, a number of
entities must be presupposed. Firstly, we have to postulate the existence of an
agent and two alternatives. Secondly, we have to presuppose the existence of a
number of relational qualities that inhere in i and that existentially depend on a
and b. We can define the truth-maker of the preferential statement pref(i, a, b)
as the (mereological) sum of the relational qualities that inhere in i and that
existentially depend on a (the value of a for i) and of the relational quality that
inhere i and depends on b (the value of b for i). That is, the truth-maker of
pref(i, a, b) is a complex relational quality that inheres in the agent i.
More specifically, we are here endorsing a weak version of truth-making, cf
[16]. In the strong version of truth-making t is a truth-maker of the sentence φ
if the existence of t is sufficient to make φ true. By contrast, t is a weak truth-
maker of φ if it makes the proposition φ true not just because of its existence,
but because of the way t contingently is. The distinction between strong and
weak truth-makers is crucial for investigating preference relation.
For pref(i, a, b), the mere existence of the sum of the the relational qualities
is not sufficient to determine the truth-value of pref(i, a, b). One has to look at
the quality values, in the category of value magnitude, of the relational qualities
“the value of a for i” and “the value of b for i”, and to check their relationship.
There are in general four cases: i) the value magnitude of a is greater than the
value magnitude of b, and in this case pref(i, a, b) is true; ii) the value magnitude
of b is greater than the value magnitude of b, and in that case pref(i, b, a) is
true; iii) they are equal (i.e. they are located in the same point of the category
of value magnitude), and in that case both pref(i, a, b) and pref(i, b, a) hold,
according to a weak version of preference (thus i is indifferent between a and b);
iv) they are incomparable, and in that case neither pref(i, a, b) or pref(i, a, b)
are true.
Thus, from an ontological perspective, the preference relation is an interesting
type of external contingent non-descriptive relation whose truth-value depends
on relational qualities as well as on a comparative relation between value magni-
tudes. We shall see this aspect in more detail by approaching, in the next section,
the formalisation of this view in OntoUML.
4 An Ontology Module for Preference in OntoUML
We represent the previous view by starting the development of a module of
OntoUML dedicated to preference relations. OntoUML [9, 8] is an ontologically
well-founded version of the UML 2.0 fragment of class diagrams, which has
been extensively used for developing an ontologically sound methodology for
conceptual modelling. Moreover, OntoUML has a denotational formal semantics
and several operational semantics done by mappings to specific formal languages
such as Alloy and Description Logics. To model preferences in OntoUML, we
introduce the modelling elements that correspond to the previous analysis. The
model is then depicted in Figure 4.
We assume a type for agents Agent, which classify the entities to which
preference relations may be ascribed. Agent is a mixin (non-sortal), i.e., a type
that can classify things of different kinds, i.e., things that have different onto-
logical natures [9]. For instance, in separating between individual and collective
preferences, agents may include individual or collective agents, with their specific
ontological differences [21].
Since we assume that agents (in the sense of entities with intentionality)
are necessarily agents (in the modal sense), we stereotype the type Agent as
a Category, in OntoUML. In other words, a Category is a type that describes
essential properties that are shared by entities of different kinds.
Agents can play the “role” of Value Beholder in a value ascription re-
lation. Value Ascription is itself an extrinsic and descriptive relation, whose
truth-maker is a Value. We represent the type Value Beholder as a role
mixin because: (i) it classifies entities only contingently, i.e., no value beholder
is necessarily a value beholder; (ii) one is a value beholder due to a relational
condition; (iii) it is a mixin, i.e., it can classify entities of multiple kinds.
A Value (the truth-maker of the value ascription relation7) is an example of
a mode [9]. A mode is an existentially dependent entity that, as such, can only
exist by inhering in some other individual. In particular, a value is a relationally
dependent mode, i.e., a mode that inheres in an individual but which is also ex-
ternally dependent on a different individual. In this case, value is a sort of mental
state inhering in the value beholder but which is also externally dependent on
a Value Entity (also termed a Value Bearer). A value mode take a value in
at least one (but possibly several) Value Magnitude Spaces. These spaces
have, in OntoUML, the semantics of the abstract conceptual spaces, delimiting
the possible values an intrinsic property can be projected into [9].
A Preference is also a relational mode but a complex one (i.e., a complex
mental state). In fact, a preference is a mode inhering a value beholder that
7 The relation of derivation connects a descriptive relation with its truthmaker. In
OntoUML, derivation is represented by a dashed line with a black circle in the end
connected to the truthmaker type [9].
is essentially composed of exact two existing values, inhering in that very same
value beholder. In other words, preference is a mereological sum of values and, in
that sense, it is similar to the relators that are the truth-makers of comparative
relations [7]. However, since in this case all the constituents of this sum inhere in
the same bearer, preference is also an intrinsic dependent entity [9]. In any case,
as a relational mode, preference is externally dependent on the value entities on
which its constituent value modes depend on (thus, it is a derived relation).
Preference serves then as the truth-maker of the ternary relation has pref-
erence. This relation is itself a derived relation that supervenes on an internal and
non-descriptive comparative relation between the Value Magnitudes of the
value modes that constitute that preference. This, of course, constrains Value
Magnitude Spaces to be spaces structured by internal comparative relations
(in the same manner that spaces such as Weight and Height afford that). More-
over, has preference is an external descriptive relation itself. It connects the
rolemixin Value Beholder with two other rolemixins Preferred Entity
and Deprecated Entity8. The classification condition of Value Entities
into playing these “roles” is given by the result of the internal comparative re-
lations between the modes constituting the preference and which are externally
dependent on each of these value entities. To put it simply, the value bearer of
the value mode that has the highest magnitude in this comparison then plays
the role of Preferred Entity; the value bearer of the one with the lower
magnitude then plays the role of Deprecated Entity. It should be clear by
now to the reader why both Preferred Entity and Deprecated Entity
are modelled as rolemixins: they both classify value entities contingently, in the
scope of a (has preference) relation, and classify entities of multiple kinds.
4.1 Types of preference relations
The module of OntoUML that we have introduced can be extended to model a
variety of types of preference relations that are used in application to specific
domains. We mentioned already the distinction between individual and collective
preference, that can be approached by refining the class of agents. An articulated
analysis of the distinction between individual and collective preferences requires
modelling the relationship between the individual and the collective attitude,
by analysing how the individuals contributes to the formation of the collective
preference, along the lines of the approach in [20, 18]. We leave this aspect for a
future dedicated work.
The distinction between ordinal and cardinal preferences can be approached
by refining the value magnitude space. In the ordinal case, we need an order-
ing structure on the set of quality values representing the value magnitudes.
The properties of the preference ordering that are required for capturing the in-
tended view of preference can be derived from the ordering structure of the value
8 Unfortunately, in English, there seems to be no exact term to refer to the non-
preferred entity of a preference relation. In Portuguese, for instance, there exist in
the lexicon both the term Preferido (to refer to the preferred entity) as well as the
term Preterido (to refer to the non-preferred one).
Fig. 1. OntoUML model for preference relations
magnitude space. For instance, if we admit transitive preferences (i.e. relations
that satisfy the condition: if pref(i, a, b) and pref(i, b, c), then pref(i, a, c)),
we need a transitive ordering on the value magnitude space.
The case of cardinal preferences requires the value magnitude space to be
constructed as a set of numbers, that provide a measure of the value magnitudes
(e.g. the real numbers). The choice of the space depends on the scale and on the
granularity assumed to assess the comparisons of value magnitudes.
A further important aspect of preference relation in the economic literature
is whether they are comparable or not, cf. [24]. Briefly, two agents’ preference
relations are comparable if there is common scale that allows for making sense
of comparisons such as “the preference of agent i for a over b is more intense
than the preference of agent j for c over d”. Comparability is a fundamental
concept in economics that allows for enabling a number of important solution
concepts in voting, resource allocation, and mechanism design. In our module,
comparability can be approached by assuming a local value magnitude space for
each individual preference relation. The assumption of comparability would then
entail that the value magnitude spaces of distinct individuals are comparable by
means of a new relation.
Finally, an important aspect of (cardinal) preference relations and in partic-
ular of expected utility theory is the role of probability to model the likelihood of
the event in which an agent obtains the objects involved in the preference rela-
tion. To include probabilities in our module, we have to provide a more complex
construction of the value magnitude space where the value magnitude associated
to a certain value also depends on the risk attitudes of the agent involved. We
leave this aspect to a future dedicated ontological foundation of expected utility
theory.
5 Conclusion
We have presented the basics of an ontological analysis of preference relations.
After discussing the type of preference relations within a taxonomy of types of
relations, we concluded that preferences are external, descriptive and contingent
relations. We investigated the truth-makers of the sentences regarding prefer-
ences and we proposed to view them as complex relational qualities that inhere
a value beholder. Prosaically, the preference is a complex mental state of an
agent.
The type of preference relations is interesting from an ontological perspective
because it requires a complex truth-making mechanism that involves both exter-
nal and internal relations, the latter type enters in the comparisons of the value
magnitudes associated to the value entities that are under comparison. Future
work shall investigate this mechanism in general to understand which relations
meet this pattern.
Then, we presented a formalisation of our view of preferences in OntoUML,
providing the essential elements of a dedicated module. The motivation for using
the OntoUML methodology is to provide an accessible and sharable modelling
of preference relations that may be applied across domains to foster the interop-
erability and the mutual understanding among modellers. Future work regards
the development of the OntoUML module to articulate specific types of prefer-
ences and the integration of the preference module with other module designed
to treat important concepts in economics, e.g. economic competition [26] and
risk [27]. Moreover, we are interested in providing a formalisation of this view of
preference in a logic-based language to integrate it with foundational ontologies
such as UFO or DOLCE [9, 2] and to study reasoners for the preference module.
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